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An Empirical Investigation of Poison Pill Use in the Banking Industry 
Abstract 
This study examines the use of poison pill plans in the banking industry. This research 
demonstrates that the increasing number of banks adopting a poison pill plan is related to 
increasing market concentration. There are two hypotheses explaining the intent of these 
adoptions: (l) Managerial Entrenchment and (2) Shareholder Interest. This study specifically 
examined these hypotheses in the banking industry between 1986 and 2003. Results indicated 
that comparison banks not adopting a poison pill had a significant improvement in ROE the year 
after their peers adopted a poison pill. Additional results of this research contradict the popularly 
held belief that a poison pill plan provides a significant improvement in the probability of 
survival. 
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I. Introduction 
The 1980s was an era of expansive mergers and acquisitions fueled by the popularity of 
corporate raids. Although this drastically changed the landscape ofmany industries, the banking 
industry was relatively untouched. Commercial banks were protected from hostile takeovers by 
federal regulations. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
supported the existence of 24,495 small banks l in 1985. However, by 2003 there were 11,021 
small banks and 80 banks had adopted a poison pill plans (Critchfield, Davis, Davison, Gratton, 
Hanc, Samolyk, 2004). The Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 was the catalyst of the rapid consolidation. Prior to this act, a commercial bank could only 
make acquisitions across state lines if state the bank was operating in and the state of the target 
allowed interstate banking. Riegle Neal removed state and federal restrictions on bank mergers 
creating rapid consolidation in the industry. 
During this period of deregulation, a growing number ofbanks adopted poison pill plans. 
A poison pill plan is a defensive measure adopted by a management team to protect a company 
from an unwanted takeover. Functionally, this measure releases additional shares of stock, at a 
discount, to shareholders of record when an unwanted acquirer achieves pre-specified stake in 
the company. This version of a poison pill plan is known as "flip-in rights." Stockholders are 
allowed to flip-in their "shareholder's rights,,3 in return for additional shares ofthe company 
(Fleischer and Sussman, 2000). Although, there are other varieties ofpoison pills, the flip-in 
right was predominantly used by the banking industry between 1987 and 2004. 
1 Smaller banks are those classified as having assets under $1 billion.
 
2 Most plans dictate that the acquirer is acting without board approval and has acquired between 15 and 20% of the
 
companies outstanding shares.
 
3 Poison Pill Plans are often referred to as shareholder's/stockholder's rights plan by the management team. This
 
terminology displays the plans in the shareholder's interests.
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In a corporation's poison pill announcement, mangers cite the adoption of the pill as a 
means to protect the rights of the shareholder. However the market reaction to the 
announcement of a poison pill is usually negative (Bojanic and Officer, 1994). Because a poison 
pill plan is adopted without shareholder approval, it strips power from the owners of the 
company. The loss ofpower decreases shareholders faith in management and is reflected by a 
decreasing stock price4• This response is further attributed to the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, a management team adopted the poison pill out of 
self-interest (Malatesta and Walking, 1988 and Ryngaert, 1988). Contrary to this hypothesis, 
positive post-announcement stock returns are attributed to the use of a poison pill as a bargaining 
strategy (Comment and Schwert, 1995 and Heron and Lie, 2000). Long-term analysis in 
operating performance also proved poison pill adoptions have positive impacts (Danielson and 
Karpoff, 2006). These hypothesis and results demonstrate the effect of a poison pill varies based 
on the intent ofthe management and length of the study. 
The commercial banks are unique because federal regulation minimizes the number of 
takeovers. The three prior hypotheses do not apply as neatly to banks because the intent behind a 
poison pill adoption is different. First, banking takeovers or mergers are characterized as being 
"friendly." Because ofthis, a poison pill used to entrench a management team is unnecessary. 
Secondly, hostile takeovers of commercial banks usually fail because ofthe stringent and lengthy 
approval process (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). The time necessary for regulatory 
approval functions as a defensive measure. Finally, the absence of a poison pill plan in this 
industry has resulted in increased takeover premiums and management benefits (Brewer III, 
Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). Acquirers do not have to fear the implementation of costly 
4 Unless previously written into a corporation's bylaws, a management team can adopt a poison pill plan and most 
other defensive measures without a shareholder vote. 
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defensive measures and reward the target company accordingly. Despite these differences in the 
banking industry, more than 70 commercial banks adopted a poison pill plan between 1986 and 
2003. 
II. Literature review 
A. Regulatory Changes 
The United States banking industry has a long history of small and geographically 
diverse banks. In 1985 there were 14,349 banks with total assets of less than $1 billion, 
however, after the liberalization of interstate banking laws there were 7,337 banks in 1995 
(Critchfield, Davis, Davison, Gratton, Hanc and Samolyk, 2004). The drastic decline in the 
number of commercial banks is attributed to two factors. First, technological improvements 
made distant acquisitions easier (DeYoung and Whalen, 1994). Fax machines, Internet 
connections, and cell phones, provided faster connections between bank branches. The Internet 
has created a paper-free medium ofnear instant responses, which has decreased the paper work 
and regulatory filing times. 
The second trend resulting in the increase in merger activity was the relaxation of 
geographic branching restrictions (DeYoung and Whalen, 1994). In 1994 the Riegle Neal Act 
allowed for nation-wide consolidation of the banking industry. Prior to its passage, bank holding 
companies were only allowed to cross state lines if the state they were headquartered in and the 
state of their perspective target had legalized interstate banking. The Riegle Neal Act overrode 
the state acts and made interstate banking legal in almost every states. 
The Riegle Neal Act not only deregulated interstate banking, but served as a catalyst for 
industry wide consolidations. Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004) examined a sample of254 
bank acquisitions between 1987 and 2001 and found that the Riegle Neal Act significantly 
5 Thus far _ banks have accepted the Riegle Neal Act of 1994. 
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increased the probability ofa bank takeover. In relation to this increased probability, there was a 
resurgence ofpoison pill adoptions. Community banks that had been common businesses in 
small towns for 50 years needed a way to protect their identity from a larger acquirer. The 
answer to this problem was the adoption ofa poison pill plan. 
The literature provides many examples ofwhy the banking industry has consolidated in 
the last two decades, but there is little evidence of the effect of the decreased number ofbanks. 
The regulatory changes resulted in an increased probability oftakeover but this has not been 
correlated with a greater number ofpoison pill adoptions. Because the banking merger activity 
is fairly recent there is little data on the affect ofa poison pill adoption. Specifically, a 
commercial bank may experience a positive or negative impact to firm value and operating 
performance after the adoption. 
B. Poison Pill Defensive Measures 
According to Malatesta and Walking (1988) and Ryngaert's (1988) hypothesis, a banks 
management team adopts a poison pill out of self-interest. The cost of this maneuver is 
measured by a decrease in share price. After the announcement, stockholders lose faith in the 
management team's abilities or are upset about the poison pill adoption not being raised raise for 
a vote. Bojanic and Officer (1994) discovered that the shareholder reactions decrease the stock 
return by -0.475% two days after the plan is announced. However, there are many variables that 
surround the adoptions of a poison pill plan. Unless the adoption is the response to an immediate 
takeover bid, the effects are not fully measured in a two-day period. Opposite this scenario, if a 
poison pill was adopted as a routine measure, then the two-day effect is representative of the 
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shareholders reactions. A two-day period is too short to analyze the banking industry, as its 
adoptions are predominantly classified as "routine measures,,6. 
Additional research on the banking industry supports the Comment and Schwert (1995) 
and Heron and Lie's (2000) value hypotheses. Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall's (2006) found 
that bank management uses defensive measures as bargaining tools. However, the bargains 
raised the takeover premium but also benefited the managerial team by securing a large 
severance package or a position in the acquiring company. Additionally, this industry is 
historically characterized for its friendly takeovers, and the deals are friendliest when the bank 
management has an assured interest in the deal (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). The 
stockholders benefit when this interest is based on stock ownership. 
A positive affect of adopting a poison pill plan is an increase in takeover premium. 
Strategically, this creates firm stability allowing for long-term research and development (Pearce 
II and Robinson Jr., 2004). The Riegle Neal Act has increased the probability of a bank 
takeover, but the results on the number of anti-takeover strategies adopted have not been 
measured. Using the Akhigbe et al (2004) results as a basis, the logical result of an increased 
probability of a bank takeover is an increased number of poison pill adoptions. 
Additional evidence supports Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie's (2000) 
increased value hypothesis. The traditionally "friendly" terms? mergers and acquisitions in the 
banking industry are conducted under reduces cases ofmanagerial entrenchment. However, 
friendly deals use a poison pill as leverage in negotiating the takeover premium and details 
(Heron and Lie, 2000). If a poison pill is adopted to increase firm value, an increase in Return 
6 Based on the announcements from the LexislNexis database. Many banks rationalize their adoption of a poison 
pill plan as a routine measure necessary to protect the shareholders from an unfair or unwanted takeover. 
7 Friendly takeovers are defined as the Target making an offer to the shareholders that the board of directors has 
approved. 
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on Equity (ROE) will be noted. Additionally, poison pill adoptions have proven to positively 
increase operating perfonnance as measured by Return on Assets (ROA) (Danielson and 
Karpoff, 2006). 
However, economy wide studies found that a poison pill adoption can have a negative 
affect on value and perfonnance (Srinidhi and Sen, 2002). A poison pill enables a company to 
engage in long-tenn research and development, which decreases ROE and ROA. Under these 
conditions, the poison pill adoption yields positive results in the long-tenn. In comparison with 
Malatesta and Walking (1988) and Ryngaert (1988), who noted negative market reactions, these 
studies noted positive financial results over a longer period. 
C. The Banking Industry 
Current banking literature explains the acquisition trend, but does not explain the effect 
of a poison pill adoption. In the post Riegle-Neal period, banks are engaging in acquisitions to 
diversify into new geographic areas and product markets based on the "earnings diversification" 
hypothesis (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Jagtiani, 2000). The intent is to create banks that are 
''too-big-to-fail'' and can exploit the remaining regulations by sheer size. As a result of the 
"grow or die philosophy," large commercial banks are actively acquiring community banks. In 
response, many community banks are making friendly takeover attempts to increase their size. 
However, the bulk of these mergers fail due to the lack of financial resources and stringent 
regulations (Kline, 1997). 
In the years since the Riegle Neal Act of 1997, the number of community banks has 
drastically declined. Prior literature has demonstrated that the disappearance ofthe small 
community banks is related to the changing regulatory state (Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte, 
2004). From this, it is hypothesized that the market consolidation will positively relate to the 
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number ofpoison pill adoptions. Second, an adoption will result in increased bank valuation and 
operating performance, consistent with Comment and Schwert's (1995) and Heron and Lie's 
(2000) hypothesis. Finally, the adoption of a poison pill will result in an increased probability of 
that a bank will not be acquired one year after adoption8. 
III. Data 
Data for this study consists of the population ofcommercial banks adopting poison pill 
plans between 1986 and 2004. The original population contained 75 commercial banks. Five 
banks were eliminated from the final sample due to a lack ofdata the sample size was restricted 
to 70. This sample was gathered from the LexisNexis database using the search terms 
"commercial bank" and "poison pill plan announced" or "shareholders rights plan." A 
comparison sample of 70 banks that did not adopt poison pill plans between 1986 and 2004 was 
also gathered. The comparison banks were matched based on their poison pill peer's year of 
plan adoption and total assets. 
The sample banks were limited to publicly traded, commercial banks, without foreign 
offices. This resulted in a sample size of70 banks. After each bank's poison pill announcement 
was found, the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website was searched to verify 
their certification number and prior history ofmergers and acquisitions. Additionally, none of 
the banks were subject to failures the year after the poison pill adoption. 
With the sample ofpoison pill banks and peer banks the Chicago Federal Reserve 
database was used to provide Net Income (NI), Total Assets (TA) and Capital Equity (CE) data 
From this information, ROE was calculated with the formula CE divided by NI. Using NI 
divided by TA, the ROA for each bank was calculated. Additionally, each bank's market share 
g This is measured as the probability that a poison pill plan will help a bank survive the year following the adoption 
as compared to a bank that does not have defensive measures. 
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percentage was calculated using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) fonnula. The HHI 
fonnula is presented below. 
n 
H=~s/ 
j=l 
Where 
Sj = the market share of finn I in the market 
n = the number of finns in the industry 
H = liN to one, with N = the number of finns in the market 
The two control variables used were Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The GDP data was acquired from the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve website for the years 1986 through 2004. From the yearly data the growth rate was 
calculated using an Excel spreadsheet. The HHI data was calculated using the yearly data 
provided by the Chicago Federal Reserve website. Similar to the market share calculations, HHI 
used an Excel spreadsheet and the HHI fonnula to calculate the banking industry concentration. 
IV. Methodology 
To analyze why the commercial banks began adopting poison pills in the mid-1990s a 
Pearson's Correlation was run on HHI and the number ofpoison pills adopted in each year. A 
second Pearson's Correlation was measured the effects ofGDP on the yearly number of 
adoptions. 
A Non-Parametric Wilcoxon Sign Ranks Test was run to measure the before and after 
affect of a poison pill adoption on ROE and ROA. The test was also run on the comparison 
sample and combined samples. 
The Wilcoxon Sign Ranks test compares matched observations providing insight about 
differences between the two populations. A positive result indicates that the post-adoption ROE 
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or ROA was higher. A negative result indicates that the pre-adoption ROE or ROA was higher. 
However, significance is required to detennine that there is a difference in the before and after 
data. 
A logistic regression measured the probability that a poison pill adopting bank would 
have a greater probability of survival one year post-adoption. The surviving groups were 
designated from the acquired groups by the dummy variable ID2. This variable designated the 
survivors with a "1" and the acquired banks with a "2." The ID2 dummy served as the 
dependent variable in the logistic regression. A second dummy variable, ID, was used as an 
independent variable measuring the probability that the poison pill banks had a greater chance of 
survival. The ID dummy designated poison pill banks with a "0" and comparison banks with a 
"I." Remaining independent variables included ROE and ROA. Control variables included 
GDP andHHI. 
The logistic regression measures the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1. 
Using the interpretation ofE(y) as a probability in logistic regression formula: 
E(y) = P(y = 1 IXI, X2, ••. ,xp) 
The probability of the poison pill adopting bank having a greater ROE, ROA, or chance of 
survival was measured. The value ofE(y) ranges from 0 to 1, with E(y) gradually approaching 1 
as the value ofX becomes larger, where X serves as the independent variable. Conversely, the 
value ofE(y) approaches 0 as the value ofX becomes smaller. The fact that E(y) ranges from 0 
to 1, with the resulting curve forming the equation, describes the probability that the dependent 
variable equals 1 (Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams, 2005). 
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v. Results 
A. Results ofthe Correlation Analysis Using GDP 
The result of the correlation analysis on GDP and number of adoptions is provided in 
Figure 1. In this graph, the year of the poison pill adoption is listed on the X-axis and the 
number ofplans adopted is listed on the left side Y-axis. The trend line presents the year over 
year change in GDP as measured by the numbers on the right Y-axis. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
The results of the correlation proved a negative relationship between GDP growth rate 
and the number ofpoison pills adopted in a year existed. A Pearson Correlation indicated at ten 
percent and five percent significance that GDP and Year have a correlation of-0.253. This 
inverse relation demonstrates that as the GDP growth rate increases, the number ofpoison pills 
adopted decreases. Opposite this, as GDP growth rate decreases the number ofpoison pills 
increases. Table 1 provides the full correlation matrix including the exact significance levels. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The nature of these results is do not imply increases in GDP growth rate cause decreased 
poison pill adoptions, but there is a relationship between changes in GDP and the number of 
adoptions. Ifpoison pills increase firm value, then an adoption during an economic downturn 
would boost a bank's financial value. However, it has yet to be proven that the adoption of a 
poison pill plan positively impacts firm value or operating performance in a bank. 
B. Results for the Correlation Analysis Using HHI 
The second correlation is graphically presented in Figure 2. The layout of the graph has 
the year of the poison pill adoption on the X-axis and the number of adoptions on the Y-axis. 
However, the trend line provides the data for the HHI, which measures the industry 
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concentration, taking values between 0 and 1. A HHI of "0" indicates a completely free market 
while "I" indicates a monopolistic market. These values are reported on the right Y-axis of the 
Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 graphically shows the increasing market concentration as the HHI trend line 
rises over the years. The Pearson Correlation revealed a positive coefficient of 0.451 at 
significance levels of ten, five, and one percent. This relationship demonstrated that as the 
market became more concentrated, the number of poison pills adopted increases. Table 2 
provides the results of the Pearson Correlation. 
Insert Table 2 here 
These results demonstrated that banks adopt poison pills in relation to increasing market 
concentration. Because the purpose of the pill is to protect a firm from unwanted acquisition, 
these results are in line with past research (Malatesta and Walking, 1988, Ryngaert, 1988). This 
correlation explains why the poison pills resurgence in the banking industry during the mid­
1990s. The Riegle Neal Act of 1997 allowed for a steep increase in market concentration, which 
related to an increasing number ofpoison pill adoptions. The national association banks wanted 
to expand their market presence and acquired more banks. In response, the traditionally small 
and independent banks sought to maintain their identity through the adoption of a poison pill. 
e. Results for the Non-Parametric Comparison 
The results for the before and after effects ofpoison pill adoption on ROE and ROA were 
measured with the Wilcoxon Sign Ranks test, presented in Table 4. This non-parametric test was 
run in three, groups presented in three different panels. Panel A provides the ROE and ROA 
results for the poison pill group ofbanks. Panel B presents the results for ROE and ROA of 
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comparison group. The PostROE and ROE variables were analyzed first. In all three panels 
Post ROE represents the ROE the year before the adoption. ROE then measures the ROE the 
year after the adoption. Similarly, PostROA represents the ROA one year prior to the adoption. 
ROA represents the ROA one year after the adoption. The results provided in Panel C are for the 
cross sample comparison representing the overall industry. 
Insert Table 3 here 
The results for the non-parametric test on the poison pill group are negative on ROE and 
ROA. The implications are that the ROE and ROA was higher after the poison pill adoption. 
These results would be consistent with the increase in operating performance and firm valuation 
hypothesis but they are non-significant at p-values often percent (Comment and Schwert, 1995, 
Heron and Lie, 2000). 
The comparison sample also provided a negative effect on ROE and ROA for the three 
years surrounding the adoption. However, the results on the before and after ROE measure were 
statistically significant. At p-values of ten and five percent, the ROE was higher for the 
comparison banks in the year after their poison pill peers adoption. This result was unexpected 
and is possibly explained by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Malatesta and Walking, 
1988, Ryngaert, 1988). Because these banks did not adopt a poison pill, the shareholders did not 
show a significant negative reaction in the form of decreased ROE. 
D. Increased Probability ofSurvival 
Of the 140 banks in the sample 10% were acquired the year after the adoption of a poison 
pill plan9• Additional data detailing the acquiring companies' names is provided in Table 6 of 
9 This figure is derived from the entire sample including both Poison Pill adopting banks and their comparison/peer 
bank. The total sample size was thus 140 banks, 70 that adopted a poison pill plan and 70 matched peer banks. The 
10% figure was based on 14 banks out of the total 140 that were acquired the year after the adoption of the 
provisions. 
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the appendix. The dummy variable ID served as the primary independent variable. In the 
logistic regression it measured the probability that a poison pill bank was more likely to survive 
than non-poison pill bank. However, the results proved to be non-significant. This meant that 
poison pill banks did not have a different probability of survival than their non-adopting peers. 
The GDP and HHI control variables were also non-significant. 
The results of the logistic regression are provided in two panels ofTable 3. Panel A 
provides the results for the logistic regression that used ROA and ID as its independent variables. 
Panel B provides the results for the logistic regression that used ROE and ID as its independent 
variables. The complete results ofboth regressions are presented below. 
Insert Table 4 here 
The non-significant results were noted when using either ROA or ROE as an independent 
variable. The first logistic regression, using ROA and ID as the independent variables, provided 
a positive B value, but was non-significant. The second regression using ROA and ID again 
provided positive B values, but also lacked significance. However, this configuration provided 
the highest B value for the ID variable. These results were contrary to my hypothesis that a 
poison pill bank would have a greater chance of survival as compared with a bank that did not 
adopt a poison pill plan. 
Conclusion 
The 1997 implementation of the Riegle Neal act opened the banking industry to cross 
border mergers and acquisitions. During the same time period, the number ofpoison pill plans 
adopted by banks experienced a second increase. The objective of this study was to examine the 
effect of the regulatory changes on the use ofpoison pills and to discover the cause of the 
resurgence in popularity of the plan. Based on data from other industries it was known that a 
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poison pill can have varying effects, depending on the variables measured and time frame used. 
Finally, the purpose of a poison pill adoption, as stated in numerous corporate announcements, 
was to protect the shareholders against an unfair takeover offer. Therefore the adoption of a 
poison pill should have increased a bank's probability of survival. 
The correlation analysis strongly related the post Riegle Neal market concentration to an 
increasing number ofpoison pill adoptions. These results were significant at all p-values and 
provide some rationale for the mid-1990s surge in the popularity of the poison pill. The 
relationship with GDP growth rate was inverse and not as strong. This meant that adoption was 
probably not due to economic factors. The strongest explanation is offered by the increasing 
market concentration as measured by HHI. In response to an increasing number of takeovers, 
smaller banks needed to adopt defensive measures, a poison pill, to protect their independence. 
In contrast to the previous research ofComment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie 
(2000), a significant improvement in finn value or operating perfonnance after the poison pill 
adoption was not noted. In addition, a significant result was noticed in the before and after 
comparison ofROE for the comparison bank sample. This result was unexpected, as the poison 
pill was hypothesized to improve ROE in the adopting banks (Danielson and Karpoff, 2006). 
The results for the logistic regression on survival probability also proved to be contrary to 
the original hypothesis. These results came closest to significance when using ROE as the 
independent variable. One explanation for the lack of significance is the relatively short post 
adoption time period examined. Looking at one year post-adoption is not long-tenn enough to 
measure survivability for banks that adopt poison pills as routine measures. The one-year time 
frame only accounts for mergers that were started during the adoption year and therefore rules 
out future acquisitions. 
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Additionally, the three-year time frame limited the poison pills effect on ROE and ROA. 
Danielson and Karpoff (2006) and Srinidhi and Sen (2002) noted their significant results using 
time periods of three to five years post-adoption. Because this sample data extended into 2004, it 
was impossible to get the data for five years after the adoption. Increasing the time frame would 
also increase the probability that a bank is subject to a hostile offer. 
The non-parametric test results may have been insignificant because the variables used 
were not entirely representative ofthe banking industry. These variables, ROE and ROA, were 
drawn from past poison pill studies that examined the all economic sectors. However, the 
banking industry is different than most sectors because they do not conduct research and 
development, are greatly affected by inflation, and answer to more investors. A future direction 
of this study is to examine the poison pills effect on the number ofdeposits and loans issued in 
the years after the announcement. 
Altogether, this study offers explanations for the resurgence of the poison pill in the mid­
1990s. However, it was unable to significantly prove that a poison pill adoption positively 
affected firm valuation and operating performance as noted by Comment and Schwert (1995), 
Heron and Lie (2000), and Danielson and Karpoff (2006). Also, logistic regression results did 
not support the hypothesis that the adoption of a poison pill plan increases the probability that a 
bank will have a greater probability of survival one year post adoption. 
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Appendix 
A. Statistical Analysis 
Table 1 provides the correlation analysis ofYear and GDP. The year variable represents the total number of poison 
pill adoptions for a particular year. The GDP variable is the United State year over year change in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as measured by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Board. The Pearson's Correlation provides a -0.253 
relation at 10% and 5% significance. This indicates that as GDP increases the number of poison pill adoptions 
decreases. The inverse relationship also means that as the number of poison pill adoptions increase, the GDP is 
likely to decrease. These results are graphically presented in Figure 1. 
Table 1 
Correlation Analysis ofYear and GDP 
Year GDP 
Year 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -0.253 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034 
N 70 70 
GDP 
Pearson Correlation -0.253 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034 
N 70 70 
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Table 2 presents the results of a correlation analysis on Year and HHI. The year variable represents the number of 
poison pill plans adopted by commercial banks in a specific year. The HHI variable is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, which measures the level of market concentration. A HHI of I represents a monopolistic market while a HHI 
of 0 represents a very open market. Results of the Pearson's Correlation demonstrate a 0.45 Irelationship between 
Year and HHI. As the market consolidates, as measured by the HHI, the number ofpoison pill plans adopted 
increases. This result supports the hypothesis that poison pill plans are adopted in response to market 
consolidations. Banks adopted these defensive measures in responses to the Riegle Neal regulatory changes that 
increased the probability of a takeover as demonstrated by Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004). Graphical 
representation of this analysis is provided in Figure 2. 
Table 2 
Correlation Analysis ofYear and HHI 
Year HHI 
Year 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 0.451 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
N 70 70 
HHI 
Pearson Correlation 0.451 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
N 70 70 
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Table 3 provides the results of the Non-Parametric Test that measured the before and after changes resulting from a 
poison pill adoption. Panel A provides the results for the poison pill banks measuring fIrst Return on Equity (ROE). 
The change in ROE is negative following a poison pill adoption, but this difference is non-signifIcant. Similarly, the 
Return on Assets (ROA) variable is negative, but the results are non-signifIcant. Panel B provides the before and 
after comparison data for the peer banks that did not adopt a poison pill plan. The ROE variable is negative, and 
statistically signifIcant. This implies that the comparison group had a higher ROE the year after the poison pills 
were adopted. The ROA variable is also negative, but is non-signifIcant. Overall, the adoption of a poison pill plan 
does not directly increase ROE or ROA in the one year follow up. 
Table 3 
Changes in operating performance before and after poison pill adoption 
Statistical data 
Mean Median Z Score Asymp. Sig. (2-tai1ed) 
Panel A: Changes in performance measured in the poison pill group 
PostROE-ROE -1.428 0.153
 
PostROA-ROA -1.441 0.150
 
Panel B: Changes in performance measured in the peer group 
PostROE-ROE -2.000 0.045 
PostROA-ROA -1.253 0.210 
Panel C: ROE & ROA as measured in both samples 
ROE ID 0 0.1396 0.1210 -0.467 0.641 
ROE ID 1 0.0999 0.1329 
ROA ID 0 0.0129 0.0098 -0.604 0.546 
ROA ID 1 0.1084 0.1227 
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Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression. This test measured the probability that the adoption of a 
poison pill plan improved the chances of survival. The independent variable ill2, represented surviving banks with 
a "I" and acquired banks with a "0." The control variables included Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and 
Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The dummy variable ill differentiated poison pill banks with a "0" from the 
comparison banks, "I." Two Logistic Regressions were run. The fIrst used the independent variables ROA and ill. 
The second used ROE and ill. Panel A provides the results for the effect on ROA and notes a positive B value for 
both ROA and ill. This denotes that surviving banks have stronger Returns on Assets and benefIt from adopting 
poison pill plans, however, these results are non-signifIcant. The second regression, presented in Panel B examined 
the impact ofReturn on Equity and ill. The B value was positive indicating an increase in ROE for surviving banks 
and increased probability of survival, but the results were non-signifIcant. The conclusion is that poison pill 
adoptions do not signifIcantly increase a bank's probability of survival one year after adoption. 
Table 4 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Equation Variables 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Panel A: Effect on ROA 
GDP 0.158 0.242 0.429 1 0.513 1.171 
HHI -7.19 22.463 0.102 1 0.749 0.001 
ROA 18.916 25.817 0.537 1 0.464 2.00E+08 
ID 0.614 0.589 1.089 1 0.297 1.849 
Constant 1.322 0.891 2.202 1 0.138 3.752 
Panel B: Effect on ROE 
GDP 0.165 0.245 0.456 1 0.500 1.180 
HHI -7.788 22.264 0.122 1 0.726 0.000 
ROE 0.584 0.594 0.965 1 0.326 1.793 
ID 1.286 0.904 2.021 1 0.155 3.617 
Constant 1.389 0.892 2.427 I 0.119 4.012 
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B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 provides the name of each of the banks in the study that adopted a poison pill provision between 1986 and 
2004. This table provides information detailing the purpose behind the adoption: Friendly Deal, Routine Measure, 
Unsolicited Proposal, Sudden Stake Accumulation, and Hostile Tender Offer. In total, 93% of the population cited 
"routine measures" as their rationale for adoption. Ofthe other four justifications, only the sudden stake 
accumulation was used by more than one bank. The hostile tender offer description, which is most commonly 
associated with a poison pill adoption, was used by one bank. The furthest column to the right details the status of 
the board of directors on the date of the adoption. The combination of a staggered board and poison pill is the 
strongest defensive measure a company can take. Unfortunately, the staggered board information for the 
comparison sample was not found and therefore not analyzed in this study. 
Table 5 
Poison Pill Bank Descriptions 
1st Constitution Bancorp 
Andover Bancorp Inc 
Arrow Financial Corp 
BNCcorp 
BSB Bancorp Inc 
BT Financial Corp 
BancorpSouth Inc 
Barnett Banks Inc 
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp 
CB Bancshares Inc 
California Bancshares Inc 
California Independent 
Bancorp 
Capital Corp of the West 
Central Co-Operative Bank 
Citizens Banking Corp 
City Holding Co 
Civic Bancorp 
Commerce Bancshares Inc 
Commonwealth Bancshares 
Corp 
Community Banks Inc 
Community Finanetal Group 
Inc 
Community First Bankshares 
Inc 
First Interstate of Iowa Inc 
First Union Corp 
First Virginia Banks Inc 
Firstar Corp 
Fulton Financial Corp 
Date of 
Adoption 
3/18/2004 
2/16/1989 
5/13/1997 
5/30/2001 
5/22/1989 
3/27/1991 
3/28/2001 
2/21/1990 
11/18/2003 
3/16/1989 
6/30/1995 
11/21/2002 
9/26/1997 
10/24/1991 
7/20/1990 
4/10/1991 
11/11/1996 
8/23/1988 
7/11/1990 
2/12/2002 
1/21/1998 
1/5/1995 
12/11/1991 
12/18/1990 
7/27/1988 
1/19/1989 
6/21/1989 
Plan Description
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Routine Measure
 
Friendly Deal
 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
Routine Measure 
State Staggered Board 
New Jersey No 
Massachusetts No 
New York No 
North Dakota Yes 
New York No 
Pennsylvania No 
Mississippi Yes 
Florida No 
Pennsylvania No 
Hawaii No 
California No 
California No 
California No 
Massachusetts No 
Michigan No 
West Virginia No 
California No 
Missouri No 
Pennsylvania No 
Pennsylvania Yes 
Tennessee No 
North Dakota No 
Iowa No 
North Carolina No 
Virginia No 
Wisconsin No 
Pennsylvania No 
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Glen Burnie Bancorp 2/17/1998 Unsolicited Proposal Maryland No 
Hancock Holding Co 
Independent Bank Corp 
LNB Bancorp,Inc 
LSB Bancshares Inc 
Lakeland Bancorp Inc 
Lenox Bancorp Inc 
Lincoln Financial Corp 
MNB Bancshares Inc 
MassBank Corp 
Mercantile Bancorp 
NBT Bancorp Inc 
NSD Bancorp Inc 
National Community Banks 
Inc 
National Penn Bancshares Inc 
North Fork Bancorp Inc 
North Side Savings Bank 
Northern Trust Corp 
Old Second Bancorp Inc 
Pacific Bank NA 
Pacific Capital Bancorp 
Patriot National Bank 
Peoples Bancorp ofWorcester 
Inc 
Provident Bankshares Corp 
Quincy Savings Bank 
Second National Financial 
Corp 
Sierra Tahoe Bancorp 
Silicon Valley Bancshares 
SouthTrust Corp 
Southside Bancshares Corp 
Suffolk Bancorp 
Surety Capital Corp 
Tolland Bank 
Trustcompany Bancorp 
US Bancorp 
USTCorp 
Union Planters Corp 
United National Bancorp 
Village Bancorp Inc 
Waltham Corp 
2/21/1997 
1/24/1991 
10/24/2000 
2/11/1998 
8/24/2001 
6/13/1999 
12/19/1989 
3/30/2001 
1/16/1990 
5/23/1988 
11/16/1994 
9/13/2002 
12/19/1990 
8/23/1989 
2/28/1989 
4/18/1996 
10/17/1989 
9/17/2002 
11/6/1996 
12/15/1999 
4/15/2004 
3/28/1989 
1/18/1995 
9/28/1992 
9/14/1998 
12/27/1995 
10/27/1998 
2/22/1989 
5/27/1993 
10/23/1995 
6/19/1997 
6/20/1989 
3/29/1990 
11/10/1989 
10/13/1995 
1/19/1989 
11/1/2001 
9/23/1996 
1/23/1989 
Routine Measure Mississippi No
 
Routine Measure Massachusetts No
 
Routine Measure Ohio No
 
Routine Measure North Carolina No
 
Routine Measure New Jersey Yes
 
Routine Measure Ohio No
 
Routine Measure Indiana No
 
Routine Measure Kansas Yes
 
Routine Measure Massachusetts No
 
Routine Measure Missouri No
 
Routine Measure New York No
 
Routine Measure Pennsylvania Yes
 
Routine Measure New Jersey No
 
Routine Measure Pennsylvania No
 
Routine Measure New York No
 
Sudden Stake 
Accumulation New York No
 
Routine Measure lllinois No
 
Routine Measure lllinois Yes
 
Routine Measure California No
 
Routine Measure California No
 
Routine Measure Connecticut No
 
Sudden Stake 
Accumulation Massachusetts No
 
Routine Measure Maryland No
 
Routine Measure Massachusetts No
 
Routine Measure Virginia No 
Routine Measure California No 
Routine Measure California No 
Routine Measure Alabama No 
Routine Measure Missouri No 
Hostile Tender Offer New York No 
Routine Measure Texas No 
Routine Measure Connecticut No 
Routine Measure New Jersey No 
Routine Measure Oregon No 
Routine Measure Massachusetts No 
Routine Measure . Tennessee No 
Routine Measure New Jersey Yes 
Routine Measure lllinois No 
Routine Measure Virginia No 
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Washington Trust Bancorp Inc 8/16/1996 Routine Measure Rhode Island No 
Wintrust Financial Corp 7/31/1998 Routine Measure Illinois No 
Zions Bancorp 9/27/1996 Routine Measure Utah No 
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Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the fate ofboth bank samples one year after the poison adoption. Out 
of the original population of70 banks that had adopted poison pills, five were acquired one year later. From the 
comparison sample, 9 banks were acquired in the same one year period. In spite of the larger number of non-poison 
pill banks being acquired, a logistic regression did not reveal a significant decrease in the probability of takeover 
associated with a poison pill adoption. 
Table 6 
Bank Descriptions 
Poison Pill Bank Acquirer Comparison Bank Acquirer 
1st Constitution Bancorp 
Andover Bancorp Inc 
Arrow Financial Corp 
BNCcorp 
BSB Bancorp Inc 
BT Financial Corp 
BancorpSouth Inc 
Barnett Banks Inc 
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp 
CB Bancshares Inc 
California Bancshares Inc 
California Independent 
Bancorp 
Capital Corp of the West 
Central Co-Operative Bank 
Citizens Banking Corp 
City Holding Co. 
Civic Bancorp 
Commerce Bancshares Inc 
Commonwealth Bancshares 
Corp 
Community Banks Inc 
Community Financial Group 
Inc 
Community First Bankshares 
Inc 
First Interstate of Iowa Inc 
First Union Corp 
First Virginia Banks Inc 
Firstar Corp 
Fulton Financial Corp 
Glen Burnie Bancorp 
Walpole Co-Operative Bank 
Fanners First Bank 
Bank One Trust Co. NA 
BNC National Bank Union Center National Bank 
Liberty Bank for Savings 
First Amarillo Bancorporation, Inc. 
National City Bank 
Continental Bank Corp 
Community Bank & Trust 
First National Bank in Wichita 
US Bank of
 
California Wesbanco, Inc.
 
Park National Bank 
First Bank National 
First National Bank ofHutchinson 
Key Bank ofWestern NY NA 
Pioneer Bancorp, Inc. 
Durant Bank & Trust Co. 
Norwest Bank Nebraska 
New Hampshire Savings Bank Corp 
Banterra Bank 
Marquette Bank Rochester NA 
Bank ofTazewell County 
Boatmen's Bank of 
North Iowa Ameribanc, Inc. 
Mellon Bank Corp 
United Bank & Trust Co. 
Emigrant Savings Bank 
Planters National Bank & Trust Co. 
Bankwest ofNevada 
Boatmen's First 
National Bank 
Grand National 
Bank 
KeybankNA 
New Dartmouth 
Bank l 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Minnesota 
RBC Centura Bank 
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Hancock Holding Co. 
Independent Bank Corp 
LNB Bancorp,lnc 
LSB Bancshares Inc 
Lakeland Bancorp Inc 
Lenox Bancorp Inc 
Lincoln Financial Corp 
MNB Bancshares Inc 
MassBank Corp 
Mercantile Bancorp 
NBT Bancorp Inc 
NSD Bancorp Inc 
National Community Banks 
Inc 
National Penn Bancshares Inc 
North Fork Bancorp Inc 
North Side Savings Bank 
Northern Trust Corp 
Old Second Bancorp Inc 
Pacific Bank NA 
Pacific Capital Bancorp 
Patriot National Bank 
Peoples Bancorp of Worcester 
Inc 
Provident Bankshares Corp 
Quincy Savings Bank 
Second National Financial 
Corp 
Sierra Tahoe Bancorp 
Silicon Valley Bancshares 
SouthTrust Corp 
Southside Bancshares Corp 
Suffolk Bancorp 
Surety Capital Corp 
Tolland Bank 
Trustcompany Bancorp 
US Bancorp 
USTCorp 
Union Planters Corp 
United National Bancorp 
Village Bancorp Inc 
North Fork Bank 
Sierrawest Bank 
PNC Bank of New England
 
Security Pacific Bank NV NA
 
Valley Bank & Trust
 
First MRCH Bank NA
 
Harris Bank Hinsdale NA
 
Border Trust Co.
 
Jefferson National Bank
 
Bank of Northumberland
 
Dubuque Bank & Trust Co.
 
Riggs National Corp
 
State National Bank
 
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co.
 
Rochester Community Savings Bank
 
Valley American Bank & Trust Co.
 
Citizens National Bank of Evansville
 
United Counties Trust Co.
 
American Express CNTRN Bank
 
Gold Bank
 
Cambridge Trust Co.
 
Citizens Banking Co.
 
First National Bank of Florida
 
Bank of A Levy
 
National Bank ofAlaska
 
First National Bank
 
Swineford National Bank
 
Portsmouth Bankshares Inc.
 
First Financial Bancorp
 
Bank Leumi Trust Co. ofNew York
 
Union Bancshares, Inc.
 
Central Bank
 
Chemical Bank Thumb Area
 
Downington National Bank
 
Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque NA
 
State Street Bank and Trust Co.
 
State Bank of Axtell
 
First National Bank of Commerce
 
Bank One WV NA
 
First National Bank ofBuhl
 
Bank of America 
NA 
Meridian Bank, 
New Jersey 
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Waltham Corp Bank ofCommerce 
Washington Trust Bancorp Inc Rapides Bank & Trust Co. in 
Alexandria 
Wintrust Financial Corp Republic Bancorp 
Zions Bancorp The Summit Bancorporation Summit Bank 
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c. Market Statistic 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used to measure the samples performance. Return on Equity 
(ROE) is defined as Net Income divided by Capital Equity. This variable examined value added by the adoption of 
a poison pill plan. Return on Assets (ROA) is defmed as Net Income divided by Total Assets. This variable 
examined the effect of the adoption on operating performance. The "Before" and "After" indicators designate the 
variables that measured the year before data from the year after adoption data. Also, the sample is divided into two 
groups, the Poison Pill Sample and Comparison Group. The Poison Pill Sample is made up of the 70 banks that 
adopted a poison pill plan from 1988 to 2004. The Comparison Group is a sample of 70 separate banks that never 
adopted a poison pill plan and were matched with the Poison Pill Sample based on Total Assets. 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Poison Pill Sample 
ROE Before 70 0.1396 0.1210 0.1583 
ROE After 65 0.1076 0.1216 0.1096 
ROABefore 70 0.2264 0.0098 1.7494 
ROAAfter 65 0.0085 0.0095 0.0095 
Comparison Group 
ROE Before 70 0.0999 0.1329 0.2853 
ROE After 61 0.1084 0.1227 0.0932 
ROA Before 70 0.0094 0.0106 0.0084 
ROA After 61 0.0091 0.0104 0.0066 
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Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the correlation analysis, non-parametric 
test, and logistic regression. The fIrst variable is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the year over year change in the 
Gross Domestic Product of the United States. The year variable measures the number of adoptions that occurred in 
a particular year. Further frequency data for the number and years of the adoptions is provided in Table 9. 
Herftndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration. HHI takes on values between I 
(monopoly) and 0 (free market). 
Table 8 
Control Variables 
Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Deviation 
GDP -0.2 4.5 3.336 3.7 1.0817 
Year 1988 2004 1994 1995 4.9117 
HHI 0.00515 0.04904 0.01302 0.0072 0.0124 
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Table 9 provides the frequency distribution for the number ofpoison pill plans adopted in each year covered by this 
study. The greatest number of poison pill plans was adopted in 1989, in line with Srinidhi and Sen's (2002) 
observation. More than 20% of the banks that adopted poison pill plans did so in 1989. Other major trends include 
a resurgence of plan adoptions in the mid-1990s, centering on the implementation of the Riegle Neal Act of 1997. 
Table 9 
Date ofAdoption Frequency Distribution 
Frequency Percentage 
1988 3 4.29% 
1989 15 21.43% 
1990 7 10.00% 
1991 5 7.14% 
1992 1 1.43% 
1993 1 1.43% 
1994 1 1.43% 
1995 6 8.57% 
1996 6 8.57% 
1997 4 5.71% 
1998 6 8.57% 
1999 2 2.86% 
2000 1 1.43% 
2001 5 7.14% 
2002 4 5.71% 
2003 1 1.43% 
2004 2 2.86% 
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D. Figures 
Figure 1 
I Poison Pill Adopted vs. GDP Growth Rate 
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Number of Poison Pill Adopted vs. BBI 
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